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SECOND -CIRCUIT NOTE
MEDic;AL MAL"PRACIcE TORT CLAIM ACCRUAL

Title 28 U.S.C. section 2401(b) 0 provides that any tort claim
against the United States shall be barred by the statute of limitations
unless the action shall have been brought within two years of the time of
accrual of that claim. The only question raised, therefore, in Toal v.
United States,"I a malpractice action, was how the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals would construe the phrase "within two years after such claim
accrues"0' 2 in the context of a medical malpractice action.
In Toal, the claimant was assured by a government physician that
the pantopaque dye, used in certain medical tests upon the plaintiff and
left in his body thereafter, would, in fact, be gradually absorbed into
plaintiff's system and would thereby cause him no injury. The government physician omitted to note the pantopaque retention in plaintiff's
discharge report, and therefore, plaintiff's private physician was unable
to learn anything at that time concerning that retention. In addition,
the plaintiff himself was prevented from acquiring the knowledge of
any possible acts of malpractice committed upon his person. It was not
until March of 1964, nearly two years after the initiation of the pantopaque into plaintiff's system, that the plaintiff learned that such was the
primary cause of his protracted illness. In a suit brought pursuant to the
Federal Tort Claims Act0 3 more than two years subsequent to the plaintiff's release from the hospital, the defense raised by the government as
to the two year statute of limitations was expeditiously overruled by the
district court, 94 an opinion later affirmed by the court of appeals. 5 This
was indeed a breakthrough. Prior to this decision, the furthest this court
had gone with regard to such an action was its holding in Kossick v.
United States.0 6 In Kossick, the United States Court of Appeals, for the
Second Circuit held that the statute of limitations, in an action such as
the one in Toal, was to commence at the time the patient ceased to re07
ceive continuous treatment from the wrongdoing doctor or hospital.
0028 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (Supp. V, 1969) amending 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1964). The

claim is to be presented in writing to the appropriate federal agency within two years
of the accrual of the claim.
01428 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'g 306 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D. Conn. 1969).
0228 U.S.C. § 2041(b) (Supp. V, 1969). The question presented in Toal is whether
the action accrues at the time of the alleged malpractice upon the plaintiff or whether
such action accrues from the time claimant discovered, or in exercise of reasonable
dilligence should have discovered, the existence of the alleged acts of malpractice upon

his person.
93 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
94 Toal v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D. Conn. 1969).
05438 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1971).
06330 F.2d 933 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 837 (1964).
97330 F.2d at 936. This holding was in line with the law of New York as stated,
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In deciding Toal, the court, for the first time,9 8 held the "discovery
rule" to be applicable to medical malpractice actions arising under the
Federal Tort Claims Act,9 9 and thus the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until "the claimant has discovered, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the acts constituted the
alleged malpractice."' 00 It would appear, however, that the court's continuous mention of the particular circumstances of the case would
indeed limit this holding to actions wherein a foreign object has negligently been left in the plaintiff's body,' 0 ' and should not be understood
as applying to all medical malpractice actions arising under federal
statute.
PENDENT JURISDICTION

The judicial inclination toward the expansion of the concept of
pendent jurisdiction 1 2 was enhanced by Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset
&Dunlap, Inc.0 s In this action for copyright infringement, unfair competition and unfair trade practices, Judge Friendly stated'0 4 that when
an unfair competition claim' 0 5 is asserted against three defendants in
one out of four counts of a complaint whose other three counts allege
copyright infringement, 10 asserted against only two of the defendants,
in Flanagan v. Mount Eden General Hospital, 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.YS2d
23 (1969), a case concerning a foreign object negligently left in the plaintiff's body.
Prior to the Flanagan decision, the law in New York as to all medical malpractice actions was that the statute of limitations commenced to run upon the patient's termination of a continuous relationship with the wrongdoing doctor or hospital. See Borgia v.
City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962); Conklin V.
Draper, 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1980).
98 Certain other circuits have been holding this way for some time. See, e.g., Brown
v. United States, 353 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1965); Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234
(5th Cir. 1962).
99 See note 93 supra.
100 438 F.2d at 224-25.
101 This decision is indeed harmonious with present New York decisional law. In
Flanagan v. Mount Eden General Hospital, 24 N.Y.2d 427, 431, 248 N.E.2d 871, 873, 301
N.Y.S.2d 23, 27, the New York Court of Appeals held that in cases "where a foreign
object has negligently been left in the patient's body, the Statute of Limitations wil not
begin to run until the patient could have reasonably discovered the malpractice." See
also Murphy v. St. Charles Hosp., 35 App. Div. 2d 64, 812 N.Y.S.2d 978 (2d Dep't 1970).
102 See 3A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PPAcricE
18.07, at 1951 (2d ed. 1971). Pendent jurisdiction is a type of ancillary jurisdiction. It is derived from an expansive reading
of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States. The Supreme Court
began the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in the case of Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). There the Court held that a federal court may
decide issues of state law when necessary to decide a federal question because the power
to decide a case must include the power to resolve all issues necessary to the decision.
103 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971).
104 Although this is not the holding of the case, it nevertheless is strong dictum and
in all likelihood will be followed in subsequent cases decided in the Second Circuit.
105 Such a claim is one which arises under state law.
106 Copyright infringement is a claim which arises under federal law. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1388(a) (1970).

